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Abstract:  
There are over 20 ‘components’ in an international door-to-door transportation, ranging 
from warehousing and distribution, to forwarding, documentation, transportation, 
customs clearance, etc.   
 
As tariffs in ocean transportation tend to converge due to competition and service 
homogenization, carriers, in competition with third party logistics service providers, 
strive to integrate door-to-door services under their control. In doing so, and among 
others, they invest heavily in logistics rather than ships that can nowadays be easily 
chartered in from institutional investors. 
 
Integration efforts however have been met with varying degrees of success in the face of 
skeptical and suspicious shippers requiring cost break downs and more transparency. 
 
With the use of game theory, this paper attempts to develop winning service bundling 
strategies for ocean carriers, i.e. global supply chain solutions under all-in prices. 
Preliminary results show that, under certain conditions, bundling can be an equilibrium 
strategy for one or more carriers, and despite leveraging around captive liner services 
and potentially enhanced profits, bundling does not necessarily lead to a loss in social 
welfare.  
 
Keywords: Bundling; Liner Shipping; Vertical Integration; Integrated Logistics. 
   2
PRODUCT BUNDLING IN GLOBAL OCEAN TRANSPORTATION 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Developments of the liner industry and the role of logistics 
As tariffs in ocean transportation tend to converge due to competition and service 
homogenization, carriers, in competition with third party logistics service providers, 
strive to integrate door-to-door services under their control. In doing so, and among 
others, they invest heavily in logistics rather than ships that can nowadays be easily 
chartered in from institutional investors. 
Although carriers have been providing intermodal services since the 1980s, it is only 
since the mid-1990s that the major shipping lines have set up logistics branches and given 
logistics activities a more central role in their group strategies, as recently surveyed by 
Midoro and Parola (2005). In this way carriers have begun competing with some of their 
own customers. 
 
Table  1: Main Logistics Branches of Shipping Lines' Groups. 
Carrier  Intermodal 
Entry  Logistics Branch  The role of the logistics branch 
within the group 
Sealand  Early ‘70s  Sealand Logistics
1 mid- 
‘90s
Taken over by Maersk in 1999 
Maersk 
Line 
Early ‘80s  Maersk 
Logistics
2 
2000 Under AP Møller Maersk  control 
(container business unit) 
NOL/APL 1979(1997)  APL  Logistics
3  1997 Under NOL control 
NYK  1985  NYK Logistics  2000 Under NYK Line control 
MOL 1985  MOL  Logistics
4  2001 Under MOL control 
K-Line 1986  K-Line  Logistics 
Holding 
2000 Holding under K-Line control (K-
Line Total Logistics brand) 
Hyundai 1990  Hyundai 
Logistics
5 
1999 Under control of Hyundai M.M. 
Hanjin  1989  Hanjin Logistics  2001 overseas operations
6 controlled by 
Hanjin Shipping 
COSCO mid-‘90s  COSCO 
Logistics 
2002 Jointly controlled by Cosco Group 
and Cosco Pacific 
OOCL ‘90s  OOCL  Logistics
7  1999 Under OOCL control 
Notes:  
(1)  formerly Buyers Consolidators (taken over by Sealand’s parent company in 1993) 
(2)  formerly Mercantile (established in 1977) 
(3)  AP Intermodal was established in 1985; the NOL group entered in intermodal and 
logistics activities only after the takeover on APL in 1997 
(4)  Formerly M.O. Air System Inc. (established in 1989) 
(5)  Formerly Asia Merchant Shipping Corporation (1988) and Hyundai logistics 
Corporation (1993) 
(6)  Domestic logistics operations are managed by Hanjin Corporation (independent from 
Hanjin Shipping) 
(7)  Formerly Cargo System, the group’s international freight consolidation unit. OOCL 
China Domestic Ltd. (since 1998) is the logistics company for China (under OOCL 
control). 
Source: Adapted from Midoro and Parola (2005) 
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The reasons behind the decision of carriers to step into the logistics sector may be 
connected to the increasing demand from the cargo owners for the provision of integrated 
supply chain services, the desire to product differentiate in the attempt to stabilise 
revenues or better control the market. 
The increasing demand of cargo owners for integrated logistics solutions lies in the 
renewed importance of ‘just in time’ deliveries, control over inventory costs and the 
reduction o uncertainty in the supply chain that are a precondition for a successful global 
distribution and production strategy. Cargo owners that have strong relations with a 
carrier may naturally prefer the shipping line to walk the extra mile instead of  having to 
involve other parties. 
The provision of logistics services may have also offered the opportunity to carriers 
to product differentiate. The ability to product differentiate in a relatively homogeneous 
market like that of container transportation, presents a large number of advantages, 
among which the attempt to price discriminate. Price discrimination, that can be 
generalized to include quantity discounts, has been made possible by the development of 
individual contracts between shippers and carriers. 
In addition logistics may represent an alternative source of revenues when the freight 
rates are at their low, allowing a sort of revenue portfolio management within the group.  
Finally, a further reason is the attempt to better control the market by tying ocean 
transportation customers also in the upstream and downstream logistics services. This 
may increase the switching costs for the shipper and work as a deterrent for competitors, 
rising entry barriers. 
The integration efforts however have been met with varying degrees of success. The 
various challenges imposed on carriers by the combination of ocean transportation with 
the services of a logistics provider can be summarised, not exhaustively, as: 
  the strategic and operational difficulties deriving from the joint provision of two 
intrinsically different services: ocean transportation, characterised by large 
assets, tight cost control and in general a business focus on asset use 
maximisation, and logistics, typically asset-light, highly competitive and with a 
distinctive focus on customer demands; 
  the sceptical and suspicious shippers requiring cost break downs and more 
transparency; 
  the complications generated by the unusual situation of integrated carriers 
competing with global freight forwarders, de facto some of their major 
customers. 
Notwithstanding some uncertainties and the aforementioned difficulties in providing 
ocean transportation within the logistics chain as an integrated service, the general 
perception of the industry seems positive, also encouraged by the successful examples of 
some leading carriers, such as Maersk and APL. 
One of the possibilities offered by vertical integration is the ability of  providing 
integrated supply chain solutions under a single price. This type of product, referred to as 
bundling or tying sales in the literature
1, has shown to be very successful in a variety of 
                                                 
1 In the industrial organization literature a distinction is made between bundling and tie-in sales, 
whereas with the former it is meant that the combination of the two products is sold in fixed proportions, 
while tie-in sales schemes are less restrictive and the mix of goods is not so rigidly prescribed (Pepall, 
Richards and Norman, 2002). In the context of logistics and supply chain nevertheless, bundle and tie-in   4
industries, from the software industry, the tourism industry, to various sector of the 
manufacturing industry. 
 
1.2  Bundling and vertical integration in the liner sector 
The practice of bundling in general does not require the company to be vertically 
integrated. As a matter of fact many third party logistics service providers are non-asset 
based and provide the bundle of services by outsourcing part or all of its components. 
Similarly, shipping lines that provide for example an all inclusive rate between two 
inland locations, do not necessarily own the transport means from the port to the inland 
location, nor the terminal where the container is unloaded, but arrange with the inland 
transport operator or with the terminal operator for delivering the all-inclusive service to 
the customer. 
It can be argued that shipping lines have always provided the service of integrating 
transportation services by means of selling intermodal transportation or quoting all 
inclusive rates. In this sense bundling is then not a new concept. What is new is the 
increased attention and the larger importance that has been given to the logistics business 
by the carriers and the change in strategy that has transformed logistics from a marginal 
activity to an important component, even if yet ancillary to ocean transportation, to the 
carrier’s group strategies. 
Bundling in the supply chain from an ocean transportation perspective naturally 
includes the provision of services such as terminal operations, feedering or hinterland 
transportation. As a matter of fact we observe that carriers tend to extend their business 
scope integrating the aforesaid services. It is difficult to argue then that vertical 
integration is not partially a direct consequence of the carriers’ decision to provide 
bundles, and analogously that bundles constitute the most logical outcome of a vertically 
integrated carrier.  
Bundles involving ocean shipping may be provided in the following contexts, all 
competing with each other to a certain extent. 
  Ocean transportation may be sold jointly with logistics services by a third party 
logistics not under the control of the shipping line. In this case the logistics 
operator may or may not be asset based. 
  Ocean transportation may be sold jointly with logistics services by the third party 
logistics within the shipping line group. In this case the shipping line presents a 
certain degree of vertical integration (at least within the group), but the other 
logistics services may or may not be provided within the shipping line group.  
  Ocean transportation may be sold jointly with other logistics services by the 
shipping line directly. In this case the shipping line may or may not be vertically 
integrated. If vertically integrated the company will use its own trains or trucks 
or dedicated terminal, alternatively it will outsource these services. 
This distinction highlights clearly the complex market structure that the provision of 
bundles creates. As shown in the figure below, the ocean carrier may be facing 
competition not only from other (integrated and non-integrated) ocean carriers, but also 
by (asset and non-asset based) logistics service providers, that are also their customers, 
                                                                                                                                                 
will be used as synonyms, also in view of the fact that generally it is assumed that each bundle is uniquely 
targeted to one shipper only. 
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by cargo owners, that may provide logistics solutions through their own logistics 
departments, and even by the logistics service provider within their own group. 
 
 
Figure 1: Bundle Alternatives in the Supply Chain. 
 
It is clear that the degree of competition is related to the nature of the components of 
the bundle. Some bundles, for example ocean transportation and terminal handling, are 
more likely to be provided at more competitive price by the ocean carrier than by the 
logistics department of large manufacturer, but in many cases this is not necessarily so. 
The competition in providing the bundle then boils down to the main question on 
how good is the bundler in assembling the bundle. This involves not only essential 
aspects such as marketing, promotion, market image, market share, etc, but also more 
eminent efficiency aspects such as how cheaply can every single component of the 
bundle be produced or outsourced and how cheaply can the bundle be assembled. 
This relates to the ability of a bundler to obtain lower prices when outsourcing 
certain services and to its production efficiency, i.e. its ability to produce the bundle 
component such as ocean transportation, feedering, terminal handling, trucking, etc. at a 
lower cost.  
The present paper aims at analysing the competitive interactions between integrated 
carriers focussing on their pricing decisions and their ability to provide bundles. The 
article will combine the results obtained by the authors during a preliminary study on the 
role of bundling in ocean transportation and will propose a simple game theory model 
based on the industrial organization literature in the attempt to identify the major 
competition issues. 
Before presenting the results of the study and introducing the model, the next 
paragraph will present a short literature overview on bundling in the general economic 
literature and in liner shipping. 
 
1.3  Bundling and liner shipping industry: existing literature 
Even if the provision of bundles has developed along with the container 
transportation industry since its beginning, as discussed in the first part of this 
introduction, it has not been the objective the academic literature. For this reason this 
literature overview will present concepts and findings from complementary research 
areas and applications from other industries, trying to infer the distinctive traits of the 
shipping industry from the limited recent literature on vertical integration in the liner 
sector.   6
A first area of research is the industrial organization literature that has dedicated 
relatively large attention to bundling and tie-in sales. The first attempt to formalize the 
concept of bundling as a pricing strategy and provide a graphical representation of 
bundles is due to Adams and Yellen (1976), even if seminal references are to be found in 
the work on transaction costs of Coase (1960) and Demsetz (1968) and Stigler (1963). 
A distinction is done in the literature on the basis of the availability of the separate 
components once the bundle is offered. The situation in which only the bundle is made 
available to customers is referred to as pure bundling (Adams and Yellen, 1976), while if 
the bundle is offered contextually to the separate components, it s the case for mixed 
bundling. 
The attractiveness of bundling is said to derive from the reduction in production 
costs or reduction in complexity costs (Fuerderer et al., 1998; Ringbeck et al., 1998), in 
the possibility to economies of scale and scope (Paroush and Peles, 1981) that can be 
connected to the extensive logistics literature on quantity discounts or from the 
complementarity in consumption of goods (Venkatesh and Kamakura, 2003). 
Another interesting stream in the literature is the impact that the practice of bundling 
has on competition. The majority of the literature focuses on monopolies that try to 
control the production of upstream or downstream industries (Adams and Yellen, 1976, 
Schmalensee, 1984; McAfee, McMillan and Whinston, 1989). Those authors identify as 
the main rationale for bundling the attempt to extract, more effectively, consumer surplus 
from heterogeneous customers through price discrimination. Adams and Yellen (1976) in 
particular demonstrate that product bundling achieves the objective of sorting consumers 
on the basis of their reservation prices thus, allowing price discrimination. Some authors 
have discussed the impact that bundling may generate by increasing barriers to entry 
(Burstein, 1960; Kühn et al., 2004), as in the well debated case of Microsoft and Internet 
Explorer. 
The literature on bundling in duopoly or oligopoly situations is more limited and 
seems to point in two directions. On the one side there are those, such as Carbajo et 
al.(1990) that emphasize the reduction of aggressiveness in duopolistic competition and 
in general find that bundling tends to decrease competition. On the other side others 
emphasize the beneficial consequences of bundling. In certain cases the practice of 
bundling may be a necessary condition for the existence of (Nash) equilibria (Liao and 
Unbano, 1998). In general is seems that mixed bundling equilibria are social optimums in 
a variety of settings and types of analyses (Tauman et al., 1997; Liao and Unbano, 1998; 
Matutes and Regibeau, 1992; Anderson and Leruth, 1993; Economides, 1993; Farrell et 
al, 1998). 
Another interesting conclusion is that in some of the models firms are worse off as a 
result of the practice of mixed bundling, as some of the games clearly present prisoner 
dilemma situations (Economides, 1993). In general though, the theoretical literature is far 
from conclusive and widely open to discussion. In particular worth mentioning are the 
relatively restrictive hypotheses that characterise some of the models in terms of 
functional demand specifications or production costs. Nevertheless these models 
represent a theoretical formalization of the bundling decision in a strategic context and 
are a useful starting point for analysing the impact of bundling in the container industry.  
While product bundling in the service sector is well documented, (see for example 
the airline industry, the joint provision of hotel accommodation and air travel, as well as   7
air travel in conjunction with bus transfers, or insurance packages), the bundling of 
logistics and transportation services has been relatively neglected, maybe because 
logistics services, such as warehousing, distribution packaging, labelling, etc. have 
traditionally been priced separately. 
The attempts in the industry to tie-in those services, such as in the case for example 
of ocean transportation and terminal handling services, have been perceived with 
diffidence by the customers. This is partially because of the incongruence of certain tariff 
designs, e.g. terminal handling charges in the same departure port substantially different 
on the basis of the port of destination. This has caused the perception to customers of 
unclear and unjustifiable pricing practices, and it has increased their preference for cost 
transparency. In spite of the above, the necessity for better responsiveness in the supply 
chain; the increasing demand for just in time logistics; and the general tendency towards 
a “one-stop-shop” could open opportunities for product bundling.  
To approach the issue of bundling in the ocean transportation and logistics sectors, a 
brief description of the two markets may be necessary. Liner shipping typically involves 
a relatively small number of players providing a fairly homogenous product 
(Haralambides and Veenstra, 2000). The degree of competition in the market is subject to 
extensive scientific debate (see or example the Sjostrom, 1989; Franck and Bunel, 1991; 
Haralambides and Veenstra, 2000).  
The logistics market, which for the purposes of bundling here could be considered as 
the secondary market, is on the contrary characterised by a larger number of products and 
suppliers. If liner companies dominate the market on the sea leg of the supply chain, on 
the land side the scene is set by third-party logistics operators (3PL) who provide, 
coordinate and oversee land transportation, often extending their role to the ocean leg as 
well. The general tendency observed in the liner sector of an increased participation in 
the provision of land based logistics services is counteracted by the practice of 3PLs of 
offering services as Non Vessel Operating Common Carriers (NVOCC). The borderline 
and the definition of the markets becomes somewhat more blurred. 
The literature on the changing role of liner companies in the provision of logistics 
services, and the increasing importance of integrated logistics in global supply chains is 
rather limited. In general, attention has been given mostly to vertical integration around 
shipping, but this has strangely not led to the provision of differentiated services under a 
single price. Even if the first attempts can be traced back to the 60’s and 70’s, the first 
structured approach to frame ocean transportation in a more complex (vertical) system 
has been proposed by Casson (1986). In this paper, the author concludes that vertical 
integration is clearly a trend in the shipping industry, stemming mostly from the necessity 
to maintain the continuity of the flow of production and from the carriers’ desire to 
market a larger range of products to respond to customers’ need (Casson, 1986). 
Casson also argues that, in the shipping industry, many of the advantages of vertical 
integration can and are obtainable by means of contractual arrangements. In the last thirty 
years, however, the number of carriers that have indeed pursued the strategy of 
integrating vertically within the supply chain has increased, following the lead of certain 
rather successful examples. Whether and to what extent the success of a carrier and its 
degree of vertical integration are connected is yet to be proven, but it seems that the 
benefits of vertical integration have actually been exploited by carriers more than what 
Casson had expected.   8
Literature on vertical integration in shipping has been scant and descriptive, rarely 
including -in the analysis of carriers’ strategy decisions- the role, the economic drivers 
and the possible market outcomes of vertical integration. This lack of scientific output on 
the topic could be justified by the limited availability of data and by a certain resistance, 
on behalf of the carriers,  to disclose information perceived as commercially sensitive.  
On the other hand, scale and network economies considerations have placed 
noticeable attention on global shipping alliances and similar forms of horizontal 
integration. The increasing recent interest of the industry and the academia in the 
possibilities offered to carriers by vertical integration finally undermines this perception 
and reaffirms the necessity of a new paradigm in the analysis of carriers strategic 
decisions. This paradigm should aim at analysing carriers’ strategic decisions mostly in 
the context of the supply chain, of which ocean transportation is an essential component.  
A good example of an analysis of carriers’ decisions within the supply chain 
paradigm just introduced is represented by the joint analysis of liner shipping and 
terminal operations in the phenomenon called dedicated terminals. The provision of 
transport together with terminal operations is one of the obvious forms of vertical 
integration in the shipping industry and represents the most immediate example of natural 
bundle in the industry. The role of dedicated terminals in the provision of container 
transport has been discussed by Haralambides et al (2002) and by Cariou (2001). The 
authors identify as a major driver behind the development of dedicated container 
terminals the greater flexibility, reliability, short turnaround times and enhanced 
efficiency in the management of the global supply chain. 
As correctly pointed out by Midoro and Parola (2006), the implications of the entry 
into the logistics market by carriers should be analysed in the context of how this 
developments occurred. In the early stages of containerisation, intermodal services, 
consolidation and warehousing were the first logistics services offered to shippers. The 
introduction of the land bridge concept in the US and the development of the West Coast 
ports boosted intermodality, with operators like Maersk, APL and Sealand in the front 
run. Immediately after this, in the 80’s, Asian companies like NYK began expanding 
their logistics activities as well. It is only in the 90’s that the scope of the term logistics 
was extended to include the idea of managing and optimising the different stages of the 
supply chain (Midoro and Parola, 2006). 
As clearly discussed by Heaver (2002), even if shipping lines are increasingly 
becoming vertically integrated, the management of logistics services remains distinct 
from the management of shipping and so does pricing. This has also been observed in a 
survey conducted by Fremont (2006): even though a large number of shipping lines 
provide logistics services, these services are in most cases neither priced nor offered in 
conjunction with ocean transportation. 
 
2  BUNDLING IN THE LINER SECTOR
2 
2.1  Market description and the rationale for bundling 
Four major groups of players seem to exist in the provision of bundles involving 
ocean transportation and logistics services.  
                                                 
2 This paragraph summarises the preliminary findings of a research project on bundling in the liner and 
logistics sectors, supported by the NOL Fellowship Research Programme, of Erasmus University and 
Singapore Management University.   9
 
  Pure liner companies. These are companies whose sole scope is ocean 
transportation. Although the number of these companies is decreasing, as the 
majority of carriers provide other services too, they may exist separately in 
the same holding group, together with a sister company that specialises in the 
provision of third party logistics services and to which the demand for 
logistics services of the liner company is channelled.  
  Integrated liner companies. Some companies have extended their operations 
vertically so that they provide logistics services to some of their customers 
and these services are performed and charged directly by the liner company 
itself next to ocean transportation. These activities have traditionally included 
hinterland transportation and feedering. 
  Third party logistics service providers connected to a liner company. Some 
liner companies have created a subsidiary or a sister company within the 
same holding group that operates as an independent third party logistics 
(3PL) business, such as NYK Logistics, Maersk Logistics, APL Logistics, 
etc. In general, these companies are independent operators and as such are 
not required to combine their logistics services with the ocean transportation 
provided by the group and vice versa. From the viewpoint of the logistics 
provider, ocean transportation is just another logistics service, and it might 
well be that in some cases, for some customers, this service may not be even 
required. The fact that the companies are under the same controlling holding, 
even if this clearly facilitates cooperation and the provision of joint services, 
does not necessarily constitute a basis for an obligatory joint provision of 
services.  
  Pure third party logistics service providers. These are logistics providers who 
are not connected to a specific liner company and purchase ocean 
transportation independently from all the carriers in the market. 
 
Carriers may decide to expand vertically either by providing logistics services 
directly within the liner company, or in-sourcing them from the group 3PL, or a 
combination of the two. In the former case, the carrier may choose to set up their own 
operations, by, for example, buying and operating trains, or outsource the services to 
external operators. All examples and different degrees of vertical integration are present 
in the industry. It appears however that it is not yet clear which of the market 
configurations presented above will ultimately prevail.  
Irrespective of this, it is generally acknowledged within the sector that logistics does 
represent the direction in which business is expanding. Even Mediterranean Shipping Co 
(MSC), which has been traditionally looked at as a company not interested in logistics, 
recently announced that it is looking into possibilities of expansion offered by the 
logistics sector.  
In any case, it is hard to consider logistics as the core business of liner operators, and 
even if there is an indication that shipping lines are investing in logistics, we are surely 
still far away from considering this as the core component of the liner business in general. 
The logistics business is in general perceived to constitute less than 15% of the total 
revenues of liner companies, and generally no more than the 30% of the revenues of the   10
group (EUR and SMU, 2006). These findings conform to the general intuition that the 
involvement of shipping lines in logistics, even if this is a rapidly growing trend, still 
offers plenty of room for expansion, and the two should be seen as complementary 
activities.  
Shipping companies do seem to be willing to expand their logistics activities as long 
as this brings in a revenue increase to the group and affords the company a strategic 
advantage over competitors. The expansion of liners into logistics is not perceived as a 
cost saving strategy, but as performing a support function to ocean transportation in the 
attempt to provide a better service to customers and differentiate the liner product. 
On the basis of the relevance of logistics in company strategy, shipping lines may be 
categorised at least in the following three groups: 
  Logistics enthusiasts: those companies that have heavily invested in logistics 
in an attempt to differentiate their service over that of their competitors. 
Among the logistics enthusiasts we can list companies such as Maersk Line 
and the NOL group. 
  Logistics functionalists: these are companies that have invested in logistics in 
order to support the demand of some of their major customers. These include 
for example some of the major Japanese carriers such as MOL and K Line, 
that entered the logistics market in the early nineties to support the operations 
of their major Japanese customers in Europe and in the USA. 
  Logistics cautious: are those companies that have invested in logistics, or are 
planning to do so, having realised that some of the market leaders are 
expanding in the sector and are thus gaining competitive advantage. 
This categorization is similar to the one provide by Midoro and Parola (2005), that 
distinguish among Highly Integrated, Latecomers and De-verticalized carriers, that points 
more in the direction of the stage of development of the level of integration, instead of 
the strategic motivation.  
Although the reasoning behind the decision to provide bundles seems to be 
motivated by a number of factors, it was never suggested by the companies interviewed 
in the context of this research that bundles were used strategically to improve market 
control (EUR and SMU, 2006). 
Specifically, the reasons mentioned as being behind bundling and vertical integration 
strategies were: 
  the necessity to accommodate the demands of the large customers that prefer 
making use of the liner company also for their logistics operations in export 
countries; 
  the attempt to compensate cyclicality in the liner industry with a steadier 
source of revenue, as, in general, revenues generated in the logistics sector 
are less dependent on the volatility of freight rates;  
  the possibility of obtaining higher margins by jointly offering ocean and 
hinterland transportation (contrarily to general belief, it did not appear during 
the interviews that margins in the ocean transportation sector are too small); 
  the necessity to improve coordination with hinterland connections, as 
increased coordination is required for effective delivery of door-to-door 
services, by shippers and logistics operators with whom the carrier works.  
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2.2  Bundling in practice 
Before discussing how bundles are composed in practice, it is important to highlight 
the difficulty in univocally establishing the range of services that are provided in the 
logistics industry and their economic characteristics. In the current research (EUR and 
SMU, 2006), the following categorisation has been proposed, a brief description of which 
is provided next to each term. 
  Terminal Handling: includes loading and unloading operations from ship to 
shore; to another vessel; to an inland-going vessel, or another means of 
transport; stacking of containers in the yard; yard movements; other 
operations, characteristic of a container terminal; 
  Warehousing: includes storage; components retrieval; sorting; and (limited) 
assembling operations that are usually performed in a warehouse;  
  Stuffing/Stripping of containers and cargo consolidation: this includes the 
loading and emptying of cargo in the container and the collection of cargo 
from various shippers and vendors;  
  Container services: they include all services that are necessary for the 
container itself, such as cleaning; pest control; fumigation; general 
maintenance; repairing; painting; etc. These services were traditionally 
performed by carriers, but they are also now carried out by terminal operators 
or specialised companies; 
  Container logistics: they comprise all movements of containers from the 
terminal to the consignor/consignee and vice versa; 
  Cargo logistics: involve all movements of cargo, from the moment it is 
unloaded from the container to its final destination; distribution centre or 
consumer. Cargo logistics also involve movements of cargo before it is stored 
in the container, from the production facility or the origin; 
  Value added logistics services: these include logistics operations on the 
cargo, such as the instalment of chips, barcodes, RFID labels, labelling, 
dating, packaging, sorting, etc; 
  Hinterland transportation: this refers to the simple movement of containers 
inland by means of truck, train or barge, as opposed to any other type of 
logistics activities performed on the container or the cargo. 
 
The above categorisation is the first necessary step for all analyses on bundling. 
Bundles are feasible as long as they reduce costs for the customers, either by increasing 
the efficiency of the control of the transportation chain, or by lowering carrying 
(inventory) costs; in other words, by reducing transaction costs. 
Ocean transportation can be provided successfully together with cargo handling, 
container services, hinterland transportation and container logistics. Other services such 
as stripping and stuffing of containers; cargo consolidation; warehousing, etc., are often 
provided by logistics operators and not by the lines themselves. Cargo logistics and value 
added logistics do not seem, so far, to fall within the scope of bundling with ocean 
transportation.  
Supply chain components that are priced jointly with liner services are 
cargohandling, container services and hinterland transportation. Warehousing appears to 
be priced jointly with liner services only upon request and in general very rarely.   12
Stuffing/stripping of containers and cargo consolidation services are provided by 
specialised companies, and although they can be priced together with ocean 
transportation, this also happens infrequently.  
The frequency of certain types of bundles, compared to others, may also depend on 
customer preferences, common practice, geography and law. For example it is common 
practice for shipping lines to provide city-to-city rates in the US. These differences may 
be substantial even within the same region.  
 
2.3  Bundle pricing in the liner sector 
From the interviews performed during the aforementioned research project (EUR 
and SMU, 2006), it became fairly clear that the major determinants in bundle pricing are 
the value the bundle delivers to the customer and the cost of providing the bundle. One 
interviewee mentions: ‘Provided the value our bundled service brings [to the customer] 
exceeds the cost of our offering, we can sell’. Another interviewee mentions that bundles 
should be priced ‘taking full recognition of the costs and revenue potential for all 
individual components. The intention of bundling is that this isn’t a discount’. 
Although a bundle is expected generally to afford shippers a lower or at least equal 
price than the sum of the prices of the individual components, this is often not the case in 
the logistics sector, where the price of the bundle may be slightly above the sum of the 
prices of the individual components, being the bundled service in principle a better 
proposition for the customer than the provision of separate services
3. In those cases in 
which the price of the bundle is below the sum of the prices of the individual 
components, this is the result of the opportunity afforded to the liner company, through a 
bundle, to ‘play’ with profit margins, as well as the advantages obtainable from lower 
costs and better coordination. This is, in the end, the comparative advantage of those 
companies that have the skills to provide a larger set of services, vis a vis those whose 
capabilities are limited to the provision of a single service, either transportation or any 
other logistics service. 
In practice the price of a bundle is set in various ways, ranging from the sum of the 
costs of the single component parts plus a margin, to the contribution margin each 
component is able to deliver, or to what the market can bear. In each case, minimum 
margin levels are required (EUR and SMU, 2006). 
Of course this price increase can only be possible if the shipper values the provision 
of a bundle as a higher quality service than the pure combination of the stand alone 
services. Often, this is because of a reduction in transaction- and coordination costs and 
in this way the shipper may be willing to give up some of the savings obtained and 
compensate the ‘risk’ taken up by the carrier. 
An additional point worth noting is that certain bundles may be unfeasible i.e. 
bundles whose cost is higher that the linear sum of component costs. Naturally, these 
bundles would not be offered. It seems though that the feasibility and profitability of 
bundles might depend on the characteristics of the supply chain in terms of cargo, 
geography, time sensitivity and policy related issues in most cases. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The case in which the price of the bundle is higher that the price of the individual components is known in 
the literature as premium bundling (Cready, 1991).   13
3  A MODEL OF STRATEGIC BUNDLING 
 
3.1  Description of the model 
The paper uses a simple game theory approach, based on Economides (1993), in an 
attempt to formulate a strategic decision process that could lead to the provision of a 
bundle. 
The major differences with the previous model is that the game here is a single stage 
game, for, in the specific context under analysis, the a priori decision of a carrier not to 
provide bundles is unrealistic and, in any case, the focus of the present model is limited to 
those carriers that do provide bundles (exclusive liner companies are kept out from the 
analysis). In addition, we introduce a parametric representation, in order to distinguish 
among the different abilities of carriers and shippers in providing the bundle. These 
parameters, which we will refer to as transaction costs, in reality summarise the 
differences among carriers in performing integrator tasks. The latter are seen as a 
function of the carrier’s marketing ability; the resources dedicated to logistics; production 
efficiency; or the carrier’s bargaining power. The disadvantage of those extensions is that 
calculations become tedious and formulas less elegant
4. 
We can simplify the analysis by assuming that each transaction is the result of a 
game between two carriers, C1 and C2. The supply chain is assumed to consist of two 
components, ocean transportation (O) and a logistics service (S). The services are 
provided by the two carriers either on their own or as a bundle.  
The bundle can be provided by C1 either by assembling its own services, or 
combining one of his own services with the services provided by his competitor. 
Naturally every service implies a cost, but in the analysis here the technical costs of 
producing the two services have been kept out, as they would make it impossible to 
obtain (analytically) equilibrium.
5 
In addition, if the shipper does not buy the bundle from either carrier but buys only 
the separate components instead (eventually by the same carrier), she is penalized by an 
additional cost component (tS) deriving from the transaction costs of assembling the 
bundle herself. Analogously, the carriers have to bear their own transaction costs when 
providing the bundle (t1 and t2 respectively). 
Implicitly we are assuming that if the carriers diverge in their ability to provide the 
bundle, the difference in the bundle prices will also increase, while the difference in the 
price of the individual components will be proportionally reduced. In other words, the 
ability of each carrier in providing the bundle is reflected in the price charged to the 
consumer. 
The game can be thought of as a single stage game, where the players (the carriers) 
decide a set of prices for the bundle and the unbundled services.  Following are the 
possible situations in the game: 
1.  The shipper buys the bundle either from C1 or C2; 
2.  The shipper buys the services separately; 
A.  The shipper buys ocean transportation from C1 and the logistics service from 
C2; 
                                                 
4 In what follows, we acknowledge use of Wolfram’s Mathematica. 
5 The impact of introducing costs on the competitive outcome is reserved for a forthcoming paper.   14
B.  The shipper buys ocean transportation from C2 and the logistics service from 
C1; 
C.  The shipper buys both ocean transportation and logistics from C1, but does 
not buy the bundle; 
D.  The shipper buys both ocean transportation and logistics from C2, but does 
not buy the bundle; 
 
Let’s now define the set of strategies  available to C1 and C2, given the set of 
coefficients, tS, t1, t2. The strategy for the carriers is defined as the set of prices Pi = {ri; oi; 
si}, i=1,2. 
Given a set of prices, Pi = {ri; oi; si}, a demand system is next required on order to 
determine the payoffs of the players. Assuming a linear demand in (ri ; oi; si), we can 
express the demand system as: 
D(B1) = a – br1 + c(o1 + s1) + d(o1 + s2) + e(o2 + s1) + f(o2 + s2) + g(r2) 
D(B2) = a – br2 + c(o1 + s1) + d(o1 + s2) + e(o2 + s1) + f(o2 + s2) + g(r1) 
D(N1,1) = a – b(o1 + s1) + c(o1 + s2) + d(o2 + s1) + e(o2 + s2) + f(r1) + g(r2) 
D(N1,2) = a – b(o1 + s2) + c(o1 + s1) + d(o2 + s1) + e(o2 + s2) + f(r1) + g(r2) 
D(N2,1) = a – b(o2 + s1) + c(o1 + s1) + d(o1 + s2) + e(o2 + s2) + f(r1) + g(r2) 
D(N2,2) = a – b(o1 + s2) + c(o1 + s1) + d(o1 + s2) + e(o2 + s1) + f(r1) + g(r2) 
 
The demand system is similar to the one used by Economides (1993)
6, with the 
difference that in this case it has been adapted to a single stage game, where the prices of 
the bundle and the separate components are set simultaneously. 
In general we will have b > c + d + e + f + g, so that an increase in the prices of all 6 
systems will decrease the demand for each system. Without loss of generality we can 
assume c = d = e = f = g. so that the demand system becomes: 
 
DB1 = a – br1 + c(2o1 + 2s1 + 2o2 + 2s2 + r2) 
DB2 = a – br2 + c(2o1 + 2s1 + 2o2 + 2s2 + r1) 
DN11 = a – b(o1 + s1) + c(o1 + s1 + 2o2 + 2s2 + r1 + r2) - tS 
DN12 = a – b(o1 + s2) + c(o1 + 2s1 + 2o2 + s2 + r1 + r2) - tS 
DN21 = a – b(o2 + s1) + c(2o1 + s1 + o2 + 2s2 + r1 + r2) - tS 
DN22  = a – b(o2 + s2) + c(2o1 + 2s1 + o2 + s2 + r1 + r2) - tS 
 
For the carrier i (i =1,2), the payoff will be defined as the difference between the 
price obtainable from selling the individual services at price (oi, si) or the bundle (ri), and 
the cost of assembling the bundle (ti). 
The payoff (profit) functions for C1 and C2 are given by: 
π1 = (r1 -t1) DB1 + (o1 + s1) DN11 + o1 DN12 + s1 DN21 
π2 = (r2 -t2) DB2 + s2 DN12 + o2 DN21 + (o2 + s2) DN22 
 
The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions: 
 
                                                 
6 As rightly pointed out for example in Liao and Taumann (2002), liner demand systems have some 
undesirable characteristics. A refinement of the analysis will be presented in a forthcoming paper.   15
∂π1 /∂r1 = DB1 + (r1 -t1) D’B1 + (o1 + s1) D’N11 + o1 D’N12 + s1 D’N21 = 0 
∂π1 /∂o1 = (r1 -t1) D’B1 + DN11 + (o1 + s1) D’N11 + DN12 + o1 D’N12 + s1 D’N21 = 0 
∂π1 /∂s1 = (r1 -t1) D’B1 + DN11 + (o1 + s1) D’N11 + o1 D’N12 + DN21 + s1 D’N21 = 0 
 
∂π2 /∂r2 = DB2 + (r2 -t2) D’B2 + (o2 + s2) D’N22 + o2 D’N21 + s2 D’N12 = 0 
∂π2 /∂o1 = (r2 -t2) D’B2 + DN22 + (o2 + s2) D’N22 + DN21 + o2 D’N21 + s2 D’N12 = 0 
∂π2 /∂s2 = (r2 -t2) D’B2 + DN22 + (o2 + s2) D’N22 + o2 D’N21 + DN12 + s2 D’N12 = 0 
 
This, simplified, leads to the following system of equations: 
 
(1) ∂π1 /∂r1 = 4c o1+2c o2 - 2b r1+c r2+4c s1+2c s2+ a + b t1= 0 
(2)   ∂π1 /∂o1 = 4(c - b) o1+4c o2+4c r1+2c r2+2(3c- b) s1+(3c - b) s2 +2(a - tS - c t1)= 0 
(3)   ∂π1 /∂s1 = 2(3c - b) o1+(3c - b) o2+4 c r1+2c r2+4(c-b) s1+4c s2+ 2(a - tS - c t1)= 0 
(1’) ∂π2 /∂r2 = 2c o1+4c o2 + c r1-2 b r2+2 c s1+4 c s2+ a + b t2= 0 
(2’) ∂π2 /∂o2 = 4c o1+4(c - b) o2+2 cr1+4c r2+(3c - b) s1+2(3c - b) s2+2a-2 c t2-2 tS = 0 
(3’) ∂π2 /∂s2 = (3c - b) o1+2(3c - b) o2+2c r1+4c r2+4c s1+4(c - b) s2+2a - 2c t2-2 tS = 0 
 
From the comparison of equations 2, 3, 2’ and 3’ we know that o1=s1 and o2=s2. 
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While the difference (o1-o2=s1- s2) is given by: 
 
  ) t (t
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s s o o 2 1 2 1 2 1 −
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These differences comply with the assumption of the model that if the companies 
diverge in their ability to provide the bundle, the difference in the bundle prices will also 
increase, while the difference in the price of the individual components will be 
proportionally reduced.  
 
The relations between r1, r2, o1+o1, o1+s2, o2+ s1 are given in the following formula, 
where the term G is provided in Table 2. 
 
c) (b   c)   55 - b   (14
 t c)   7 - b   (2   4
   
  c)   11 - b   (10   c)   55 - b   (14
G





+ + =  
 
 
Table  2: G term in the differences between the bundle prices and the prices of the separate components 
o1+s1 70  b
2 t1 + 44 c
2 (11 t1-4 t2) + bc (-400 t1+43 t2) 
o1+s2 = o2+s1 70  b
2 t1 + 3 bc (-124 t1 + 5 t2 )+ 22 c
2 (17 t1 -3 t2)  r1 
o2+s2 70  b
2 t1 + 44 c
2 (6 t1+t2) - bc (344 t1+13 t2) 
o1+s1  bc (43 t1-400 t2) + 70 b
2 t2+ 44 c
2 (-4 t1+11 t2) 
o1+s2 = o2+s1  3 bc (5 t1-124 t2) + 70 b
2 t2 + 22 c




bc (13 t1+344 t2) + 70 b
2 t2 +  44 c
2 (t1+6 t2) 
 
The differences between o1+o1, o1+s2, o2+ s1 are given in Table 3. 
 
Table  3: Differences between pairs of combined prices 
o1+s1 0 
o1+s2 = o2+s1  2 c (t2-t1)/ 10 b-11c  o1+s1 
o2+s2  4 c (t1-t2)/ 10 b-11c 
o1+s1  2 c (t1-t2)/ 10 b-11c  
o1+s2= o2+s1 0  o1+s2 = o2+s1 
o2+s2  2 c (t2-t1)/ 10 b-11c 
o1+s1  4 c (t2-t1)/ 10 b-11c 






The model allows for the specification of t, and we can see that the bundle price is 
affected by the difference in the transaction costs of the two carriers in assembling the 
bundle, allowing only the company with the lowest assembling cost to bundle. 
Let’s start with the simplest case where t1 = t2 = tS = 0. In this case clearly r1 = r2 = r 
and o+s=o1+s1=o1+s2=o2+s1=o2+s2. The non-cooperative equilibrium prices are given by: 
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It is clear that the price of the bundle will be always lower than the price of the 
unbundled alternatives (o+s). This conclusion is also in line with economic theory, for, in 
a duopoly, the bundle will be the Nash equilibrium of the game if no transaction costs are 
taken into account. 
Let’s consider now the case where t1=t2=t with t > 0, while tS is still equal to 0. We 
know that clearly r1=r2, and o1+s1=o1+s2=o2+s1=o2+s2=o+s, so the consumer is indifferent 
between carrier 1 and carrier 2. In this case though, the price of the bundle is not 





















, then the price of the bundle will be higher than the price of the separate 
components and the equilibrium in the game will shift to the provision of separate 
components. It will here be more profitable for the shipper to buy the non bundled 
alternatives
7. 
In general, as long as tS is small relatively to t, the price of the bundle will remain 
above that of the sum of the individual components. In case t is also positive, the 
equilibrium prices are given by: 
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Specifically, as long as t> θ tS, where θ is the following quantity, 
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7 Note that we are assuming that b≥5c, then the quantity a/7(b-4c) is always positive.   18
then the price of the bundle is greater than the sum of the prices of the individual 
components. Clearly if tS is significantly greater than t, then the bundle will be always 
preferred. 
We can extend this analysis to the case where the carriers incur different costs in 
assembling the bundle, so that t1 ≠ t2, i.e. one of the two carriers is better at providing the 
bundle. We can assume that t1 < t2. 
Let us start with the case where t1 < θ tS. In this case, the bundle to be sold will be the 
one provided by carrier 1, at price 
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which is clearly lower than r2 (the opposite will of course be the case when t2 < t1 and t2 < 
θ tS) 
If t1 is greater than θ t S, i.e. θ t S<t1<t2, then the bundle will not be sold and 
min{o1+s1, o1+s2, o2+s2} = o1+s1= 2o1 = 2s1. If on the contrary t1 > t2 and t > θ tS then the 
equilibrium price will be min{o1+s1, o1+s2, o2+s2} = o2+s2= 2o2 = 2s2. Finally the for the 
carriers to sell a component each in the unbundled alternative, it will have to be 






6) 11(a 5a)b 2(12
a)c 11(4 5a)b 2(2
t
t
a)c 11(4 5a)b 2(2










These conditions clearly cannot hold, given that both  t1 and t2 are both non-negative. 
This implies that if t1 ≠ t2 then equilibrium exists only if the shipper consumes service 1 
and service 2 of the same carrier or one of the bundles is provided. 
Table 4 summarizes the cases just discussed. 
Table  4: Transaction costs and equilibrium outcomes 
Situation Conditions  Selection of the shipper  Lowest price 
A1 {
θ tS<t1 
t1<t2  Separate components  o1 + s1 
A2 {
θ tS<t2 
t2<t1  Separate components  o2 + s2 
B1 {
t1 < θ tS 
t1 < t2  Bundle provided by carrier 1  r1 
B2 {
t2 < θ tS 
t2 < t1  Bundle provided by carrier 2  r2 
C {
t = t1 = t2 
t> θ tS  Separate components  o + s 
D {
t = t1 = t2 
t< θ tS  Bundle  r = r1 = r2 
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The model shows that the carriers in reality are competing on the bundle not only 
among themselves but also with their customer. 
 
3.2  Results of the model 
The theoretical model described above is an attempt to discuss the implications of 
bundling of separate activities that involve a certain cost of producing the bundle. 
Intuitively we would expect the transaction costs of the carrier to be lower than those of 
the shipper (tS). In reality the model may apply to a situation where those demanding the 
separate services are the freight forwarders. For some of them tS may actually be lower 
than the transaction costs of the carriers. 
In real markets, then, the carrier who has the possibility to offer bundles is exposed 
to competition from two sides. On the one hand, he is forced to reduce his bundle price, 
for he is competing directly with other carriers. This pressure stems from the 
competitiveness of each carrier in assembling the bundle. On the other hand, the carrier 
faces competitive pressure generated from the demand side. 
In previous papers it has been shown that mixed bundling is a dominant strategy in 
duopoly for both firms, even if its outcome is not the best possible (Prisoner Dilemma). 
In the situation outlined in our model we show that, in reality, differences in the ability to 
provide the bundle -wrt the ability of providing the bundle from the demand side, may 
justify the decision of a company not to provide bundles. If a carrier knows that 
compared to his competitors, or alternatively to his customers, the costs of providing 
bundles are too high (implying that the competitor will provide a cheaper bundle or the 
customer will be able to assemble the bundle cheaply herself) then the best strategy 
available will be not to provide bundles and focus only on the separate components. 
In the specific case of the model used here, mixed bundling is a dominant strategy 
for carriers depending on the distribution of transaction costs. The analysis shows though 
that the equilibrium elasticity to a change in transaction costs of the carriers is much 
higher than that of a change in the transaction costs of the shipper. 
 
3.3  Welfare effects 
Welfare calculations are omitted in the paper, as the results are analogous to those 
obtained in the existing literature on bundling in oligopoly, albeit much more tedious. 
The addition of transaction costs does not add anything to the results obtained for 
example in the aforementioned article of Economides (1993) or Liao and Taumann 
(2000). For the purpose of our discussion it should be noticed that mixed bundling is 
socially beneficial as it lowers consumer prices and increases choice for consumers.  
 
 
4  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH TOPICS 
 
4.1  Sum-up of the paper 
The paper provides a contribution to understanding the decisions that may lead to the 
provision of bundles of ocean transportation and logistics services. The authors 
summarise the finding of a preliminary market research among shipping lines and 
analysed bundling specifically from an industry perspective, with the help of a game 
theoretic model.    20
Among the major conclusions of the paper is that bundling seems in practice to be 
motivated by: cost advantages; demand drivers; differentiation strategy; the possibility of 
obtaining higher margins by jointly offering ocean and hinterland transportation; the 
necessity to better control coordination costs with hinterland connections. 
The model tries to complete the picture, evaluating the outcomes of competition in a 
duopoly where carriers compete on prices, can sell individual components or bundles and 
both carriers and the shipper incur a cost in assembling the bundle. Similarly to some of 
the models presented previously in the literature, our paper shows that price competition 
between carriers is increased due to the existence of the bundled product. Another 
interesting result is that the equilibrium elasticity is higher to changes in the shipper’s 
ability of providing the bundles (tS) than with respect to a change in the carriers’ ability to 
assemble the bundle (t1 and t2). 
 
4.2  Further research topics 
The paper raises a variety of questions and research issues that need to be 
investigated further. Firstly, further research is needed on the specific issues of shippers’ 
perception of bundles and bundle pricing strategies of carriers. 
The model presented is far from complete and may require further testing. In 
addition one of its major limitations is the assumption on the demand form. The authors 
are in the process of modifying the underlying assumptions of the model and extend it to 
the case of oligopoly in industries characterised by increasing returns to scale. This 
represents an additional research direction that is interesting per se. 
The understanding of bundling is of great interest to the industry as well, as it 
remains unclear whether the expansion of the scope of services of shipping lines from a 
terminal-to-terminal service to a warehouse-to-warehouse and finally a door-to-door 
service is the best path to follow for all companies. The question on what are the limits of 
vertical integration and what are the most profitable ways going forward is still pertinent. 
The industry understands the idea behind this but the implications and the effects that this 
may have on the profitability and the characteristics of the sector are still not fully 
understood and deserve further research. 
Further research is also needed to understand the competitive advantage that is 
achieved by the expansion of the scope of the business of carriers. If bundles are priced at 
a lower rate than the stand alone services, this in the end will increase competition both in 
the shipping and in the logistics markets, and this is the outcome of our simplified model. 
In addition, from a purely practical perspective, if shipping is still profitable by itself, the 
question remains why a shipping line should move into a new business that requires 
specific competences and market knowledge. 
Shipping lines are traditionally more concerned with control of costs and equipment, 
while the extended use of bundling requires a shift of business approach to a more 
customer oriented one. So maximising asset utilisation and at the same time increasing 
customer satisfaction seems the necessary approach for a successful implementation of 
bundling, but how to achieve this in practice is still not yet understood.  
Further research areas include: 
  The potential in terms of efficiency gains and higher revenues obtainable by 
shipping lines from the provision of logistics services and the ability to better 
coordinate the supply chain. From a purely operational point of view it seems   21
it would be important to investigate what are the limits of vertical integration 
and what is the best model to follow in expanding the liner business to the 
logistics sector and if this is the right way to go; 
  What is the market impact of bundling and what type of competitive 
advantage does it generate, both in terms of competition among shipping 
lines and between shipping lines and logistics providers; 
  What are the benefits obtainable for shippers from the provision of bundles of 
ocean transportation and other logistics services, how can optimal bundles be 
identified, marketed and priced and how can policy constraints be removed in 
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